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United States v. Halper: Making Double 
Jeopardy Available in Civil Actions 
In May of 1989 the Supreme Court published its unani-
mous decision, United States v. Halper, 1 in which the Court 
expanded the Double Jeopardy doctrine to apply to civil as 
well as criminal cases. The decision went largely unnoticed; 
however it did create a small stir in the legal community.2 
Since that time several legal scholars have discussed 
Halper:3 some of them have applauded Halper because it 
expanded the constitutional safeguard of Double Jeopardy, 
others have criticized Halper because it created additional 
issues of constitutional concern. Regardless of the position 
these scholars have taken, they have all focused on the 
expansionary aspects of the Halper opinion. As this note 
will demonstrate, this focus is misplaced. 
Part I of this note will review the history of Double 
Jeopardy, part II will review the Halper decision, and Part 
III will then review the subsequent decisions by lower 
courts interpreting Halper. This note will conclude that the 
lower courts have refused to apply Halper expansively, but 
instead have used it only in "rare cases" to prevent gross 
injustice. 
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
adopts the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. It reads in part, 
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."4 The doctrine of Dou-
ble Jeopardy was not new at the time of the Constitution, 
1. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
2. Fred Strasser et al., Little-Noticed Case May Have Big S&L Impact, NAT'L 
L.J., June fi, 1989, at fi. 
3. Lauren Orchard Clapp, Note, United States v. Halper: Remedial Justice and 
Double Jeopardy, 68 N.C. L. REV. 979 (1990); Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime 
from Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 
WASH. U. L.Q. 929 (1990); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Pro· 
ceedings After United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990); Lynn C. Hall, 
Note, Crossmg thP Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited Punish· 
ment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-United States v. Halper, 
65 WASH. L. REV. 4~i7 (1990); Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, 
Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (1991). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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traces of Double Jeopardy are found as early as 355 B.C .. 5 
However, it did not begin to develop in English common law 
until the thirteenth century.6 Over the next five hundred 
years, the doctrine of Double Jeopardy continued to evolve 
in English common law, but by modern standards remained 
very limited.7 
Because of its muddled beginnings in common law, 
Double Jeopardy is not easily defined. In the United States, 
Double Jeopardy got a slow start,8 and early Supreme 
Court cases did not treat Double Jeopardy in any consistent 
manner. 9 
By 1873 the Supreme Court held that the words "life or 
limb" should be read broadly to include all felonies and 
misdemeanors, and that Double Jeopardy protection attaches 
equally after both a previous conviction and a previous 
acquittal. 10 The Supreme Court had not yet decided wheth-
er Double Jeopardy would apply to civil cases.n 
During the 1930's the Supreme Court further refined 
the Double Jeopardy doctrine. In Blockburger v. United 
States/2 the Court defined "the same offense"13 language 
of the Constitution when it said, "where the same act or 
5. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY vii (1969). 
6. The first mention of a Double Jeopardy type plea can be found in No. 76, 
Select Pleas of the Crown, Shropshire Eyre (1203), cited in Jill Hunter, The Devel-
opment of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J.L. & HIST. 1, 1 n.3 (1984). 
Scholars differ on the precise origins of Double Jeopardy in English common law. 
Three prevailing views exist: (1) it was borrowed from ecclesiastical law, (2) it was 
transplanted from Roman law, and (8) Double Jeopardy was developed indepen-
dently as a part of Anglo-Saxon criminal procedure. JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2-8 (1969); FRIEDLAND, 
supra note 5, at 5-8. Perhaps the Oklahoma Supreme Court summed it up best 
when it said Double Jeopardy "seems to have been always embedded in the com-
mon law of England, as well as in the Roman law, and doubtless in every other 
system of jurisprudence, and instead of having a specific origin, it simply always 
existed." Stout v. State, 130 P. 553, 558 (Okla. 1913), quotPd in SIGLER, supra at 1. 
7. SIGLER, supra note 6, at 16-21. 
8. Sigler suggests that this was due to the fact that federal criminal statutes 
were not as prevalent in the early days of the nation as they are now. SIGLER, 
supra note 6, at 35. 
9. J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework 
for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 392-9::! (1976). 
10. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). 
11. United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603 (1881); see Clark, supra note 9, at 
392-93, for a more detailed discussion of the Court's opinions during this historical 
period. 
12. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
proVIsiOns, the test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provi-
sion requires proof of a fact which the other does not."14 In 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 15 the Court decided that Double 
Jeopardy did not apply to civil cases, and that it was with-
in Congress' power to determine which causes of action are 
civil and which are criminal. 
Thus, by the end of the 1930's, Double Jeopardy was 
fairly well defined in the United States. It applied in all 
criminal cases that had been previously adjudicated and 
which relied on proving the same factual issues. Double 
Jeopardy was not, however, available in civil proceedings. 
Since Halper turns directly on the issue in Mitchell, 
whether Double Jeopardy is available in civil proceedings, 
this case note will review Mitchell in more detail. In 1937 
Mitchell was acquitted of filing a fraudulent tax return. 16 
In a subsequent civil proceeding, based on the same tax re-
turn, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that 
Mitchell had fraudulently failed to report income which led 
to an underpayment of taxes amounting to $728,709.84. 
Because fraud was involved, the Commissioner imposed a 
50% fine of $364,354.92. Mitchell appealed, eventually reach-
ing the Supreme Court. In his appeal Mitchell argued that 
the civil fine of $364,354.92 was barred on Double Jeopardy 
grounds since it was based on the same conduct for which 
he had been acquitted in a previous criminal prosecution. 
The Supreme Court held that "unless this sanction was 
intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essen-
tially criminal, the Double Jeopardy clause provided for the 
defendant in criminal prosecutions is not applicable." 17 In 
deciding if the action was "intended as punishment," the 
court said "that question is one of statutory construction."18 
14. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Court later 
held that Blockburger did not prevent Congress from creating multiple punishments 
as long as they are prosecuted in a single proceeding. Ball v. United States, 4 70 
U.S. 856 (1981l); for a more detailed discussion see Donald E. Burton, Note, A 
Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clau:;e, 49 01110 ST. 
L.J. 799 (1988). 
15. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
16. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1937). 
17. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938). 
18. !d. at 399. 
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In other words, Congress had full power to determine 
whether a proceeding was civil or criminal. If Congress 
labeled a proceeding criminal, it would be subject to Double 
Jeopardy protections. However, if Congress labeled a pro-
ceeding civil, it would not receive any Double Jeopardy 
protections. To determine the label Congress had placed on 
a statute, the court examined congressional intent. 
In Mitchell the Court applied a three-part test to deter-
mine Congressional intent: first, whether the sanction being 
imposed and other similar sanctions had previously been 
treated as civil;19 second, whether Congress expressly pro-
vided civil procedures for the action at bar; and third, 
whether the Revenue Act provided two distinct remedies, 
one civil and one criminal.20 In applying these three factors 
the Mitchell Court held that Congress intended to make the 
action civil. 
In 1943 the Supreme Court heard another case in 
which it was asked to apply Double Jeopardy in the civil 
context. In United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess, 21 Marcus 
brought a qui tam suie2 on behalf of the United States 
19. In justifying the sanction at bar, the Court states that the fine is remedial 
in that it makes up for lost revenue to the United States, the cost of investigation, 
and the cost of taxpayer fraud in general. The Court recognized these actions as 
civil "in spite of their comparative severity." [d. at 399-401. 
20. The criminal remedy, for which Mitchell was acquitted required a "willful 
attempt to evade and defeat the tax" and provided for up to $10,000 in fines and 
up to five years in prison. 26 U.S.C. § 145(b) (1928) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201-7203, 7343 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). The civil remedy, for which Mitchell 
was found liable, required a fraud against the government with the intent to evade 
a tax, and provided a fixed fine of 50% of the deficiency in the tax paid. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 293 (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6653, 6659 (Supp. II 1990)). 
21. 317 U.S. 537 (194:~). 
22. A qui tam action is 
[a]n action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a 
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that 
the same shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go 
to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to the state 
or some other institution. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (5th ed. 1979). 
The Supreme Court has stated that the rational behind qui tam actions is that 
"[i]n such situations society makes individuals the representatives of the public for 
the purpose of enforcing a policy explicitly formulated by legislation." Priebe & 
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (194 7) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (193R), the qui tam action was autho-
rized by :n U.S.C. § 37::lO(b)(1988), which allowed a private party to bring a suit 
on behalf of the United States. If the plaintiff prevailed the district court could 
award the private party up to 25% of the proceeds. See United States v. Halper, 
551] UNITED STATES V. HALPER 555 
against Hess and several other electrical contractors in the 
Pittsburgh area. Marcus charged, and the lower court 
agreed, that the respondents had colluded in their bidding 
on Public Works Administration projects, defrauding the 
United States government. The lower court found the re-
spondents civilly liable for $2,000 on each of fifty-six viola-
tions plus $203,000 for double the actual damages the gov-
ernment sustained. Unlike Mitchell however, which dealt 
with a previous acquittal, the respondents in Hess had been 
previously convicted in a criminal trial based on the same 
conduct. The respondents appealed, arguing that since they 
had pled nolo contendere to a previous criminal indictment 
and were fined $54,000, the previous criminal action barred 
this subsequent civil suit on Double Jeopardy grounds.23 
The Court, relying on Mitchell, stated that Double Jeop-
ardy would only bar a subsequent suit if it was criminal, 
and that the determination of whether the action was crim-
inal was one of statutory construction. In determining the 
issue of statutory construction the Court looked at two key 
facts: first, Congress had created both a criminal and a civil 
remedy for the conduct involved; and second, the purpose of 
the statute, as shown in congressional debates, was primari-
ly remedial. The Court said, "This remedy does not lose the 
quality of a civil action because more than the precise 
amount of so-called actual damage is recovered."24 
Of particular importance in Hess is the concurring opin-
ion by Justice Frankfurter.25 Justice Frankfurter proposed 
that instead of using a statutory construction test, the Court 
should use a total penalty test. He stated that Congress 
may use either one or two proceedings to carry out its rem-
edies against the respondent. As long as the total remedies 
envisioned by Congress are not exceeded, the Double J eopar-
dy clause will not be violated.26 
490 U.S. 435, 444 n.5 (1989). 
23. United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943). 
24. Id. at 550. 
25. ld. at 553. 
26. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion is of particular importance, because 
the Halper Court may have been guided by his reasoning. Frankfurter's words are, 
I w ]here two such proceedings merely carry out the remedies which Con-
gress has prescribed in advance for a wrong, they do not twice put a 
man in jeopardy for the same offense. Congress thereby merely allows the 
comprehensive penalties which it has imposed to be enforced in separate 
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The Court again visited the issue of Double Jeopardy in 
the civil context in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States. 27 Rex 
Trailer arose out of a fraud perpetrated on the United 
States government during the purchase of surplus war 
goods. The Rex Trailer Company pled nolo contendere to a 
criminal indictment based on the fraud. Subsequent to that 
plea, the government instigated a civil suit seeking $10,000 
in fines. 
In defending the civil action, Rex Trailer Company ar-
gued that Double Jeopardy barred this civil action since it 
followed an earlier criminal conviction based on the same 
conduct. Again, the Court relied upon a statutory construc-
tion test. Applying the test, the Court said that the remedy 
was equivalent to liquidated damages in civil contract law 
and was thus civil.28 Further, the Court found that the 
fine approximated the actual damages incurred by the gov-
ernment.29 
Thus, by the 1980's, the use of Double Jeopardy in 
criminal proceedings only was well established. To determine 
whether an action was civil or criminal, the Court consis-
tently followed a statutory construction test. 30 In 1984 how-
ever, the Court dealt a serious blow to the use of the statu-
tory construction test in the Double Jeopardy context. 
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,31 
the Court said that in determining whether an action is 
civil or criminal, a court must go through a two-part test:32 
first, determine whether Congress either expressly or im-
suits instead of in a single proceeding. 
!d. at 555. 
27. ::l50 U.S. 148 (1956). 
28. The Court found influential the fact that the remedy was found in the 
same statute that allowed the government to contract with private parties to 
dispose of surplus war goods. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150 
(1956). 
29. The damages stemmed from several sources: the government's inability to 
make bona fide sales of the goods, the decrease in goods available to the gov-
ernment, and the unjust enrichment of the Rex Trailer Company. The Court said 
that the level of actual damages was impossible to determine with certainty, 
however, the uncertainty supported the need for liquidated damages in the statute. 
ld. at 153-54. 
30. 70 C.J.S Penalties § 10 (1987). 
31. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). 
:-l2. ld. at 362-6:-L The court relied on United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 
(1980), which used the same two-part test to determine if Fifth Amendment self 
incrimination protection applied. 
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pliedly intended one label over another; second, if Congress 
intended to create a civil remedy, then examine whether 
"the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate that intention."33 Applying the second 
part of the test, the 89 Firearms Court stated that, '"[o]nly 
the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfei-
ture are punitive will suffice to override Congress' manifest 
preference for a civil sanction."34 The 89 Firearms Court 
did not find "the clearest proof," and did not allow the Dou-
ble Jeopardy defense to stand.35 However, the reasoning of 
the opinion implies that in some situations, the Court may 
override Congressional designation of an action as civil. 
II. UNITED STATES V. HALPER: A REVIEW OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural Background 
Irwin Halper managed a medical laboratory in New 
York City. During 1982 and 1983 Halper submitted sixty-
five false Medicare claims to the government defrauding it 
of $585.36 Halper was convicted, fined $5,000, and sen-
tenced to two years in prison.37 Subsequent to Halper's 
conviction, the government brought a civil suit against him 
seeking $130,000. 38 
The district court granted summary judgment on the 
issue of liability in favor of the government based on the 
facts established in Halper's criminal conviction. However, 
33. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63 
(1984) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)). 
::l4. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 
617 (1960) (deciding whether an action should be treated as civil or criminal for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment)). 
::ln. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366. 
36. Halper submitted numerous claims using code 9018, which paid either $10 
or $12. Halper should have only used code 9018 for the first patient treated each 
day at a private facility. After treating the first patient, Halper should have 
submitted the claims using code 9019, which paid $3. The 65 false claims amount-
ed to an overpayment by the Government of $585. 
::l7. In July of 1985 Halper was convicted for submitting 6fi false claims to the 
U.S. Government under 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988), and of 16 counts of mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (sending the fraudulent claims to Blue Cross 
through the mail). 
38. The government sought $2,000 per false claim under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3n 1 (1988) (The act also allowed the government to seek double the damages it 
actually sustained, plus the cost of litigation). The act was amended in 1986 to 
provide a fme of $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim, plus three times the actu-
al damages suffered by the government. 
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on the issue of the remedy, the district court ran into prob-
lems. It found that imposition of the civil remedy was not 
rationally related to the damages the government had sus-
tained, and amounted to punishment. Thus, awarding the 
government the full $130,000 would violate Halper's Double 
Jeopardy rights. The court said that imposition of the fine 
was discretionary under these circumstances and thus re-
duced the fine to $16,000.39 
The government moved to have the district court recon-
sider the case, which it did.40 Upon reconsideration, the 
district court admitted that it was wrong in holding that 
the remedy was discretionary. However, the court still felt 
that Halper's Double Jeopardy rights were violated, and 
thus ruled that part of the statute unconstitutional. The 
district court ruled that the government could only seek 
double its actual damages ($1,170), plus the cost of the liti-
gation. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court, and certiorari was granted.41 
B. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court. In 
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court had to overcome 
contradictory precedent. The Court set up the issue by stat-
ing that "[t]his Court many times has held that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 
multiple punishments for the same offense."42 As the Court 
distinguished opposing precedent, it continually referred back 
to these three principles. One important issue the Court 
saw in these three principals that isn't immediately appar-
ent is that the first two principles apply only to criminal 
cases, while the third principle may apply to both criminal 
and civil cases in certain circumstances.43 
39. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
40. United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
41. The United States appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982); prob. juris. not-
ed, United States v. Halper, 486 U.S. 1053 (1988). 
42. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
43. The Court relied on language in Mitchell to make this point. "The Double 
Jeopardy Clause, . . . 'prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second 
time to punish criminally, for the same offense.'" Halper, 490 U.S. at 442 (quoting 
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The government argued that Helvering v. Mitchell, Unit-
ed States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, and Rex Trailer Co. v. 
United States barred a Double Jeopardy defense.44 The 
Court, however, distinguished the facts of each case from 
the case at bar. 
First, the Court argued that Mitchell differed from 
Halper since Mitchell's criminal proceeding ended in acquit-
tal. Thus, the Mitchell Court was not concerned with the 
third . ' ong, double punishment, but only with the first two 
prongs. On the other hand, since Halper was convicted dur-
ing his criminal proceeding, the Court needed to focus only 
on the third prong. The Court also noted that the Mitchell 
Court found "that the deficiency sanction was in fact reme-
dial, providing reimbursement to the Government for investi-
gatory and other costs of the taxpayer's fraud."45 So, even 
if the Mitchell Court had been dealing with the third prong, 
it wouldn't have had to deal with the situati faced in 
Halper, since the civil penalty was remedial. 
The Court had more difficulty distinguishing Hess46 
since Hess had been previously convicted under the False 
Claims Act. However, the Court found that Hess did not 
apply to Halper "[s]ince the actual costs to the Government 
roughly equaled the damages recovered, ... the Court sim-
ply did not face the stark situation presently before" itY 
Similarly, the Court distinguished Rex Trailer48 since 
that Court found that the civil remedy sought was roughly 
equivalent to the damages sustained by the government.49 
C. Creating a New Rule 
Both legal scholars and courts had previously focused on 
the statutory construction analyses of Hess and Rex Trailer. 
Helvering v. Mitchell 303 U.S. :191, :199 (19:18)). 
44. The Government argued that those cases stood for the following three 
propositions: "first, that the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple 
punishment protects against only a second criminal penalty; second, that criminal 
penalties are imposed only in criminal proceedings; and, third, that proceedings 
under, and penalties authorized by, the False Claims Act are civil in nature." 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. 
45. ld. at 442-4:1. 
46. United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. fiil7 (1943). 
47. HalpPr, 490 U.S. at 44fi. 
48. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, ilfill U.S. 148 (19fi6). 
49. HalpPr, 490 U.S. at 445-46. 
551] UNITED STATES V. HALPER 561 
Ill. APPLYING UNITED STATES V. HALPER 
Since the Halper Court did not overrule earlier cases, 
one must determine how this new rule interacts with them. 
The first step in one's approach to a Double Jeopardy prob-
lem today should be to determine which prong of Double 
Jeopardy as outlined in Halper applies to the particular fact 
situation. As mentioned earlier, the three prongs of Double 
Jeopardy outlined in Halper are: (1) a second criminal pros-
ecution for the same offense after a criminal acquittal; (2) a 
second criminal prosecution for the same offense after a 
criminal conviction; and (3) multiple punishments (either 
criminal or civil) for the same offense.56 If the first two 
prongs of Double Jeopardy apply to a particular fact situa-
tion, traditional Double Jeopardy analysis should be used. 
However, when the third prong applies to a particular fact 
situation, one must then apply the two-part test of United 
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms:57 (1) statutory 
construction (i.e. did Congress intend to make the remedy 
civil?), and (2) if the answer to the first question is yes, 
then should the remedy be classified as criminal despite 
Congress' intentions (one should apply the reasoning of 
Halper to answer this question). 
A. Is the Remedy Civil or Criminal? 
Since 1989, lower courts have had numerous occasions 
to apply Halper. However, only two courts since then have 
expressed a willingness to halt a civil proceeding due to 
Double Jeopardy. A brief analyses of the cases applying 
Halper follows. 
In United States v. Mayers, 58 the court faced a set of 
facts similar to Halper. Mayers, a chiropractor, had been 
civilly convicted of submitting 307 false Medicare claims, 
defrauding the government of $24,697.73. A civil penalty of 
$1,791,100 was assessed against Mayers in 1986 (amounting 
to seventy-two times the government's medicare overpay-
ment).59 Subsequently, Mayers was convicted criminally for 
56. !d. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
57. 465 U.S. ;{54, ;{62-63 (1984). 
5R. 897 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1990). 
59. Mayers v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 806 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 
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the same conduct. Mayers raised the Double Jeopardy de-
fense on appeal. 
The circuit court held that Mayers' Double Jeopardy 
rights may have been violated. It instructed the district 
court to rule on issues of fact to determine whether the 
criminal convictions and sentences violated Double Jeopardy, 
and, if so, either to set the convictions and sentences aside, 
or to modify them accordingly.60 Before the district court 
could rule on the issue, the parties settled. 
The second case, United States v. Hall, 61 arose out of 
the illegal exportation of $1,035,000 in bearer negotiable in-
struments from the United States to the Bahamas. Through 
a plea bargain agreement Hall pled guilty and was sen-
tenced to one year in prison, two years special probation, a 
$10,000 fine, and 400 hours of community service. Subse-
quently, the government brought a civil suit against Hall for 
$1,035,000.62 The court held tha1 the subsequent civil suit 
was a violation of the plea agreement and dismissed the 
case. 
Despite the dismissal, the court discussed Hall's Double 
Jeopardy claim. 63 The court stated that the government 
had not established that its actual losses were anything 
near the $1,035,000. For this reason, the court stated that 
Halper would forbid the case from proceeding. The court 
said that if it had not already dismissed the case on other 
grounds, it would have required the government to submit 
an approximation of its losses before proceeding.61 
19R6). 
60. United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir. 1990). 
61. 7:30 F. Supp. 646 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
62. The government relied on 31 U.S.C. § fi321(a)(2) which reads in part: 
The Secretary of the Treasury may impose an additional civil penalty on 
a person not filing a Report . . . A civil penalty under this paragraph 
may not be more than the amount of the monetary instrument for which 
the Report was required. A civil penalty under this paragraph is reduced 
by an amount forfeited under Section fi:H 7(b) of this Title. 
quotf'd in, United States v. Hall, 730 F. Supp. 646, 64R-49 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
6::L The court stated: 
Even if the court were not to grant Hall summary judgement due to the 
Government's hreach of the plea agreement, the Government's attempt to 
assess this civil penalty could still be challenged as violative of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy clause. Thus, the court finds it necessary to put forth a 
brief discussion of the parties' arguments on that point. 
United States v. Hall, 7:'!0 F. Supp. 646, 6fi3 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
64. Id. at 65fi. 
1 
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Since the court had dismissed the government's suit, the 
court's reasoning is simply dicta. However, it does show that 
this district court might have been willing to bar the 
government's suit under Halper. 
Thus, at least two courts appear willing to bar civil 
litigation under the Halper approach, however, more numer-
ous are the cases in which courts have found that Halper 
will not stand as a bar to a subsequent suit. Some of those 
cases never reached the issue of whether the civil sanction 
is punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy. Instead, 
they distinguish Halper since the subsequent suit is brought 
by a private party65 or by a different sovereign.66 
The cases that squarely face the issue in Halper have 
all refused to find a situation in which Halper will stop 
subsequent litigation. Since no court has overturned a civil 
penalty on Double Jeopardy grounds, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine at what point they will be willing 
to do so. However, some insight can be gained by reviewing 
the arguments the lower courts have found persuasive m 
refusing to apply Double Jeopardy to a civil fine. 
1. Immeasurable Government Losses 
Many courts face situations in which the government's 
losses cannot be easily defined. Some courts dispense with 
those cases by distinguishing the facts of the case from the 
facts of Halper, while others set up rules to determine when 
damages become punishment. Finally, some courts simply 
try to aim for "rough justice."67 
65. "The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by liti-
gation between private parties." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989), 
quoted in Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1989). Other cases 
distinguishing Halper on the same grounds: Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. 
Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989) (the issue ·was not a past criminal conviction, but past 
punitive damages judgements); Man v. Raymark Indus., 72H F. Supp. 1461 (D. 
Hawaii 1989) (multiple punitive damage suits). 
66. The following courts held that Halper only applied when the same sov-
ereign brought both suits: United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., Inc., 926 
F.2d fi84 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 
1989); United States v. Anthony, 727 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (false medicaid 
claims). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 765 F. Supp. 12fil (E.D. Va. 1991); 
United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. United 
States Fishing Vessel Maylin, 725 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
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a. Distinguishing Halper on the facts. Some courts 
have chosen to rely on the "prolific but small gauge of-
fender" language of Halper. 68 One example of those courts 
is United States u. Pani. 69 The facts of Pani were almost 
identical to the facts of Halper. Pani was a surgeon who 
made numerous false Medicaid claims. He was convicted on 
three of those claims (amounting to $1,380), ordered to pay 
$5,567 restitution, $30,000 in fines, and complete 400 hours 
of community service. The government subsequently brought 
a civil suit against Pani for 157 fraudulent claims. Since 
Pani had only been convicted on three claims, the court re-
stricted its holding to those three. The civil damages relat-
ing to those claims totalled $32,46070 (about twenty-five 
times the amount of the false claims). 
The court didn't address the issue of whether the 
$32,460 bore a rational relation to the government's loss. In-
stead, it simply relied on the "prolific but small gauge of-
fender" language of Halper. Since only three counts were 
involved, the court held that Pani was not a prolific offend-
er, and thus Halper did not apply. 71 
This focus on the "prolific but small gauge offender" 
language seems to be based on the rationale put forth in 
Halper that part of the harm is that the defendant is being 
punished more than the statute contemplated. 72 If courts 
followed this rationale strictly, as did the Pani court, Halper 
would be very limited. 
b. Using rules to define punishment. 
(1) Seizure of profits is not punishment. In 
United States u. Moore,73 a Navy employee received pay-
ments from a private company amounting to about $100,000. 
6R. United States v. Moore, 765 F. Supp. 12fi1, 12.'i7 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
69. 717 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
70. The statute had changed since Halper. Instead of limiting damages to 
$2,000 per claim, the statute now allowed the government to seek from $5,000 to 
$10,000 per false claim. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ :1729-::l731 (1988). 
71. United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
72. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989). Other cases explicitly 
mentioning this argument are: United States v. Reed, 9::l7 F.2d 575, 577 (11th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Cunningham, 757 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Ohio 1991); United 
States v. Moore, 765 F. Supp. 12fi1 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
7:-l. 765 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
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The employee entered a plea agreement to which he pled 
guilty to violating federal law. 74 Subsequently the govern-
ment brought a civil suit to recover the $100,000. The court 
held that Halper did not bar the civil suit for two reasons: 
first, the court focused on the "prolific but small gauge 
offender" language discussed above; second, even though the 
government had not accounted for its losses, by definition, a 
private payment to a government employee damages the 
government to the extent of the payment.75 
The second reason the court gave for denying Moore's 
Double Jeopardy claim goes to the heart of Halper. When 
do damages reach the point that they become punishment 
for Double Jeopardy purposes? The Moore court made a 
clear rule to dispense with the matter: whenever a defen-
dant profits from illegal activity, a civil suit by the govern-
ment to take those profits will not rise to the level of pun-
ishment.76 
(2) Forfeiture ~s not punishment. The First 
Circuit ruled that forfeiture cases will never amount to 
punishment, and thus a Double Jeopardy will never 
stand. 77 The court's reasoning was dubious however. It rea-
soned that forfeiture was civil since the Supreme Court held 
that it was in United States v. One Assortment of 89 
Firearms. 78 The First Circuit failed to recognize that 89 
74. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a), cited in United States v. Moore, 765 F. Supp. 1251 
(E.D. Va. 1991). 
75. The court's reasoning behind this policy is not clear. The court simply held 
that the damage caused to the G:>vernment when employees receive payments from 
third parties "is the appearance of a conflict of interest. Consequently, any pay-
ment received in violation of the statute, no matter how large, is by definition not 
disproportionate to the harm caused." United States v. Moore, 765 F. Supp. 1251, 
1257 (E.D. Va. 1991). Even though the court did not explain its reasoning, its 
ruling is in agreement with the law of restitution in contract cases, which has 
traditionally been characterized as civil, and was likely influenced by that law. 
76. The same argument was used in United States v. Cunningham, 757 F. 
Supp. 840, 846 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("(M]oney taken from society through illegal ac-
tivity then subsequently forfeited is merely maintaining the status quo and cannot 
be labeled punitive in nature."). 
77. United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court 
dealt with forfeiture cases arising under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). 
78. 465 U.S. ::!54 (1984). The Court also cited United States v. $250,000 in 
United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1987) and United States v. One 
1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that forfeiture cases 
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) are civil). 
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Firearms is antithetical to that view point .. In 89 Firearms, 
the Court did not dispose of the case by simply stating that 
forfeiture is civil. Instead, the Court investigated the harsh-
ness of the forfeiture to see if it was punitive for Double 
Jeopardy purposes. 79 
Other courts have rejected the forfeiture rule put forth 
by the First Circuit. In United States v. 38 Whalers Cove 
Drive,80 a district court in the Second Circuit was willing 
to investigate the harshness of the forfeiture. The court held 
that forfeiture of a $70,000 home did not fall within the 
scope of Halper since the $70,000 compensated the govern-
ment for the illicit profits and "collateral consequences of 
facilitating drug traffic."81 
In United States v. United States Fishing Vessel 
Maylin, 82 and in United States v. Cunningham,83 district 
courts in the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, respectively, were 
also willing to investigate the harshness of a forfeiture to 
see if it qualified as punishment under Halper. Both courts 
held that the forfeitures were not extreme enough to 
amount to punishment. 
c. Aiming for rough justice. Many courts either 
cannot dispose of the Double Jeopardy claim without evalu-
ating the magnitude of the civil penalty, or they feel that 
doing so is necessary after disposing of Halper on other 
grounds. These courts show a clear pattern in weighing an 
amorphous government loss against a specific dollar penalty. 
They are all very reluctant to find that the damages do 
anything more than compensate the government. 
United States v. United States Fishing Vessel Maylin84 
is illustrative of the process that many courts go through 
when they must weigh an indeterminate government loss 
against a specific dollar penalty imposed against the defen-
dant. In that case, the owner of the fishing vessel had pre-
viously been convicted of fish and game violations.85 Sub-
79. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. ~j.54, 362-63 
(1984). 
80. 747 F. Supp. 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
81. ld. at 180. 
82. 725 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
83. 757 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
84. 725 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
85. The conviction relied upon the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(3)(A), 
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sequent to those convictions, the government brought a 
forfeiture proceeding against the vessel involved in the crim-
inal conduct. The owner argued that Double Jeopardy ap-
plied to the case, and thus the civil proceeding was barred. 
The court found the value of the claimant's boat to be 
$55,000. However the court had more difficulty establishing 
the losses the government had incurred. In determining 
those losses, the court listed the areas in which the govern-
ment was harmed. The court found that the government 
suffered losses due to the cost of investigation, the cost of 
enforcement, and the cost of the damage to the wildlife. 
While the court could not put a dollar amount on those 
costs, it held that it could not find that the amount of the 
forfeiture was not "rationally related" to those enumerated 
yet indeterminate losses. For that reason, it held that the 
forfeiture was civil in nature.86 
This court took a "rough justice" approach. It simply 
looked at the dollar amount the claimant suffered, and the 
areas in which the government suffered. Based on that, it 
made a rough estimate as to how they compared. This ap-
proach carries with it the danger that courts may vary 
widely in how they apply Halper. A review of the cases that 
do so shows that courts unanimously come down in favor of 
the government.s7 A few of those cases are discussed in 
:i:j73( d)( 1)(B) (19RH). 
R6. The court said, "[t)he court cannot say that that figure represents an 
amount not rationally related to the injury caused to the Government." United 
States v. United States Fishing Vessel Maylin, 725 F. Supp. 1222, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 
19H9). This statement implies that. this court places a high burden on the defen-
dant. Compare this court's statement to the proposition that a court will apply 
Halper if it cannot say that the government's losses are rationally related to the 
civil penalty. 
It is unclear what approach other courts take. While other courts have not 
used the language of Maylin, they have ruled in favor of the government. 
87. United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1991) (a 30 day suspension 
of a postal worker did not amount to punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes, 
because the purpose of the suspension was to protect the Government); Greene v. 
Sullivan, 7:n F. Supp. R3H, 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (a pharmacist's five year exclu-
sion from participating in the Medicare program was not punishment. The court 
likened the exclusion to "professional license revocations for lawyers, physicians, 
and real estate brokers which have the function of protecting the public and have 
routinely been held not to violate the doubly jeopardy clause."); United States v. 
Marcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 19R9) ($20,000 penalty for 
insider trading compensated the Government for losses incurred including those of 
investigation and prosecution. Also held that a prior civil punishment could poten-
tially bar a subsequent civil proceeding); United States v. WRW Corp., 731 F. 
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more detail below. 
In Bernstein v. Sulliuan,88 the court held that $51,942 
in civil fines based on $2,000 in false Medicaid claims 
(about twenty-five times the amount of false claims), did not 
amount to punishment. 
As mentioned earlier, in United States v. 40 Moon Hill 
Rd.,89 the court disposed of the case simply because it was 
a forfeiture. However, the court then went on to add that a 
forfeiture of a 17.9 acre tract of land used in the drug trade 
did not constitute punishment since it simply remedied the 
government for the "ravages of drugs upon our nation and 
the billions the government is being forced to spend upon 
investigation and enforcement-not to mention the costs of 
drug-related crime and drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation, 
and prevention."90 
In United States v. Cunningham,91 Cunningham had 
civilly forfeited $423,850 which he had used to purchase 
thirty kilograms of cocaine. The government then brought 
criminal actions against Cunningham. 92 Cunningham ar-
gued that the $423,850 civil forfeiture constituted punish-
ment and thus Double Jeopardy barred the criminal prose-
cution. The court held that the "$423,850 and a lengthy 
prison sentence would not be overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate to the damage he has caused."93 
These cases illustrate that courts are unwilling to find 
that penalties are so severe that they amount to punish-
ment. In so finding, the courts are frequently willing to look 
at more than just the amount taken from the government. 
They are also often willing to consider the costs of enforce-
ment, litigation, and the costs to the public in general. The 
courts do not seem to clearly distinguish between the extra 
Supp. 237, 239 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (a $90,350 civil penalty for mine safety violations 
"is not so extreme and divorced from the United States' expenses incurred in the 
investigation and prosecution of the defendants' violations to constitute punishment, 
rather than the remedial goals of ensuring safe mining conditions and practices."). 
88. 914 F.2d 1395 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
89. 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989). 
90. ld. The court concurrently disposed of the case on two other grounds. First, 
civil forfeiture suits are never criminal no matter how harsh; second, Double 
Jeopardy does not apply to dual sovereigns. 
91. 757 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
92. Cunningham and nine others had been indicted by a grand jury on 28 
counts of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l), R4l(b)(l)(A)(ii). 
93. United States v. Cunningham, 757 F. Supp. R40, R46 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
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costs created by the defendant, and the costs created by all 
wrongdoers similarly situated to the defendant. Clearly, the 
more costs a court is willing to consider, the less likely it 
will be to find that a penalty is disproportionate to those 
costs, and thus apply Double Jeopardy. 
2. Measurable Government Losses 
When courts have been able to assess the government's 
damages in dollar terms, they have also refused to invoke 
Double Jeopardy protections. 
In United States v. Fliegler,94 the court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the government for $115,000 
after the government submitted affidavits showing their 
costs of litigation in both the criminal and civil proceedings 
was $110,564.90. 
United States v. Bizzell95 arose out of violations of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations. As a 
result of those violations, the potential loss to HUD was 
very large. In a civil proceeding, Bizzell and HUD agreed 
that Bizzell would either refrain from dealing in HUD pro-
grams or would pay HUD $30,000. Mter the settlement, 
HUD negotiated with a third party, mitigating the 
government's losses to $2,000.96 Subsequently, the United 
States indicted Bizzell for committing fraud against HUD. 
Bizzell raised the defense of Double Jeopardy. 
The trial court held that the $30,000 fine was so re-
moved from the government's loss of $2,000 that it consti-
tuted punishment. The appellate court disagreed. It held: 
first, that debarment from participation in HUD was reme-
dial, since its purpose was to protect the government 
against further loss, second, the $30,000 fine was not pun-
ishment, since at the time the settlement was entered into, 
the government's losses exceeded $30,000, and thus the 
purpose of the fine was remedial. 97 
Bizzell thus implies that at least this court will look at 
the government's losses at the time the civil suit is final-
ized, regardless of any subsequent mitigation. 
94. 756 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
95. 921 F.2d 263 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
96. The government's losses were reduced to the cost of investigation and liti-
gation. Id. at 265-66. 
97. Id. at 267. 
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B. Using Halper to Invoke Other Constitutional Protections 
Just as courts have been reluctant to apply the Halper 
Double Jeopardy defenses in civil suits; they have likewise 
refused to use Halper to extend other constitutional 
protections. 98 
In a tax case, the Fourth Circuit did leave open the 
possibility that Halper may have created other constitutional 
protections in some instances. 99 The court faced the issue 
of whether ex post facto protection extended to a statute 
that imposed a twenty-five percent penalty on a tax under-
payment while the old law imposed only a ten percent pen-
alty. The court held that if the penalty was punishment, as 
defined by Halper, the ex post facto protection would attach. 
Since the amount of underpayment was $10,933.07, the 
new law imposed a penalty of $2,733.27, in addition to the 
payment of the deficiency plus interest. 100 The court, using 
the analysis of Halper, ruled that the penalty was civil, and 
thus Karpa was not protected by the ex post facto 
protections of the Constitution. 101 
In Bernstein v. Sullivan, 102 Bernstein claimed that 
Halper forbade the government from pursuing a civil claim 
against him because the original statute of limitations had 
lapsed. After its lapse, the government passed a new statute 
of limitations that allowed it to proceed against Bernstein. 
Bernstein claimed that this violated his due process rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mter citing a 
number of cases that held that extending the period of the 
statute of limitations does not violate due process rights, the 
court dismissed the argument stating, "Halper does not 
involve a statute of limitations."103 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 104 the court admitted 
that the reasoning in Halper was in some tension with 
existing civil contempt law. However, the court refused to 
98. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 748 F. Supp. 67, 79 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (refused to require state to use a higher burden of proof when 
seeking punitive damages). 
99. Karpa v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1990). 
100. ld. at 785. 
101. !d. at 788. 
102. 914 F.2d 1::l9fi (lOth Cir. 1990). 
103. !d. at 1403. 
104. 894 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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use Halper to extend additional constitutional protections to 
civil contempt since Halper "was not a [civil] contempt 
case."105 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES V. HALPER 
These cases show an extreme reluctance by lower courts 
to bar or overturn subsequent proceedings on Double Jeop-
ardy grounds. In fact, no court has overturned a civil penal-
ty on Double Jeopardy grounds. 
A. Government Prosecutions 
In the wake of Halper, legal scholars predicted that 
prosecutors would face pressures to consolidate actions, drop 
either the criminal or civil proceeding, reduce the amount 
sought in civil proceedings, create remedial funds, provide 
more detailed cost accounting, eliminate fixed penalty stat-
utes, or get the defendant to waive his Double Jeopardy de-
fense in settlement agreements. 106 The lower court opin-
ions have demonstrated the opposite. Since the lower courts 
have refused to overturn civil proceedings on Double Jeop-
ardy grounds, prosecutors would be unwise to resort to such 
means to avoid the Double Jeopardy defense. Instead, prose-
cutors should proceed with the knowledge that lower courts 
will read Halper very narrowly. 
B. Civil Defendants 
Civil defendants should not take much solace in Halper. 
Clearly, the chances of a civil defendant prevailing based on 
a Double Jeopardy argument are poor. Defendants would be 
wise to consider the possibility of future civil proceedings 
when plea bargaining in a criminal suit, and when negotiat-
ing settlement of civil suits. 
Nevertheless, the Double Jeopardy defense may continue 
to have some intimidation factor against prosecutors. In fact, 
there is some evidence that prosecutors are worried about 
the Double Jeopardy defense created in Halper. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission has begun placing Double 
Jeopardy waivers in plea bargain agreements in criminal 
105. !d. at R85. 
106. Eads, supra, note 3; Glickman, supra, note 3. 
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cases. 107 By raising the defense, defendants may be able to 
use Double Jeopardy as a bargaining chip in negotiating a 
more favorable settlement with prosecutors. Even if prosecu-
tors realize that their chances of prevailing over a Double 
Jeopardy defense are extremely high, they may be more 
likely to settle when it is raised due to the remote possibili-
ty that they might lose. 
C. Future Litigation 
The lower courts show great disparity in measurements 
of the government's losses. The Supreme Court created this 
disparity by its inconsistent treatment of the government's 
loss in Halper. In Halper, the Supreme Court said that 
$130,000 was "an amount more than 220 times greater than 
the Government's measurable loss."108 This implies that 
the government's "measurable loss" was $585, or the amount 
of the fraud. However, the Supreme Court later said that 
the District Court found the government's measurable loss 
to be about $16,000 after including the costs of the litiga-
tion.109 If the Court had used the $16,000 as the 
government's loss, it would have found that the fine was 
only eight times more than the government's loss. If the 
Supreme Court had included the cost of litigation, it may 
have ruled differently. It may have found that a fine only 
eight times greater than the government's loss was not 
excessive. Even if the inclusion of the costs of litigation 
would not have made a difference in Halper, they may in 
other cases. 
The lower courts have usually included the government's 
costs of litigation before determining whether the fine is 
rationally related to those costs. Some lower courts have 
even included government costs arising from enforcement, 
investigation, and the harm to the public. A few lower 
courts have included the costs incurred by the government 
in these areas not simply attributable to the defendant, but 
attributable to all wrongdoers similarly situated. 
107. Richard J. Morvillo, Caught in a Double Bind: In a Cunning Dodge Around 
the Constitution, the Government Voids the Guarantees of Protection Against Double 
Jeopardy for Defendants in Cases that Involve the SEC, NAT'L L.J., June ::l, 1991, 
at 13. 
108. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 439 (1989). 
109. !d. at 452. 
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This wide disparity may be used to the advantage of 
both prosecutors and defenders in attempting to reach the 
result they desire. Clearly, prosecutors should argue that 
the govemment's measurable loss includes things such as 
the costs of enforcement, investigation, litigation, and harm 
to the public. Prosecutors should include as much cost data 
as possible, however when cost data is not available, they 
should not hesitate to argue that those indeterminate costs 
should nonetheless be included. 
Conversely, defendants should argue that in Halper the 
Supreme Court only looked at the cost of the actual fraud 
when deciding if the amount sought was disproportionate to 
the govemment loss. The extra costs should only be includ-
ed at the end of the analyses. Defendants should also argue 
that the generalized costs of all wrongdoers should not be 
included in any circumstances, since doing so is contrary to 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Halper. 
This disparate treatment of government costs must be 
resolved by the Supreme Court, since failure to resolve this 
issue will only continue to create confusion and unequal ap-
plication of the law by the lower courts. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of additional costs by lower courts may destroy the 
Double Jeopardy defense the Supreme Court attempted to 
create. 
V. CONCLUSION 
United States v. Halper overturned years of precedent 
by holding that constitutional Double Jeopardy protections 
apply to civil cases in some instances. Specifically, the Court 
held that whenever a civil penalty "may not fairly be char-
acterized as remedial," Double Jeopardy prohibits the gov-
ernment from pursuing that remedy. 110 In applying this 
doctrine however, lower courts have reserved the Halper 
doctrine for rare cases where the civil penalty sought bears 
no rational relation to the costs incurred by the govemment. 
The lower courts have never ruled that a case meets this 
criteria. 
This narrow reading of Halper by lower courts indicates 
that Halper will not have far-reaching effects, and will be 
extremely limited in application. While defendants will sure-
110. !d. at 44H. 
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ly continue to argue that Halper applies to their case, pros-
ecutors may proceed with confidence, knowing that Halper 
will rarely stand as a bar. 
Nelson T. Abbott 
